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Introduction 
In The Shareholder Value Myth,1 law professor Lynn Stout pitches her 
tent firmly in the camp of the nascent and prematurely moribund Occupy 
Wall Street movement.  And if contradictions abounded among Occupy Wall 
Street folks, they similarly flourish in this slim text.  This book 
simultaneously argues that the idea of shareholder primacy is—in addition to 
being a myth—(a) “the dumbest idea in the world”;2 (b) “an ideology, not a 
legal requirement or a practical necessity”;3 and (c) bad law.4  My responses 
to these observations are: (a) shareholder primacy is not an idea at all; 
(b) shareholder primacy is an ideology, but like certain other ideologies, such 
as the ones about the Constitution being sacred or the one about God not 
being dead, it is quite useful in a wide variety of situations and contexts; and 
(c) shareholder primacy is not bad law because it is not law at all—at least 
not in the cartoonish version often presented—and nobody thinks that it is.  
There is of course a difference between ideology and law, and the fact that 
shareholder primacy is an ideology does not mean that it is irrelevant to law; 
and it does not even necessarily mean that there is anything wrong with it.  
Christianity, Judaism, capitalism, and vegetarianism are ideologies rather 
than laws.  But a lot of people find them convincing and even inspirational 
all the same. 
Sadly, in my view, many people, and academics disproportionately, hate 
ideology of any sort and consider the very idea of ideology to be abhorrently 
 
 * Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Regulation, Yale 
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1. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012). 
2. Id. at 5–6 (quoting Francesco Guerrera, Welch Condemns Share Price Focus, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/294ff1f2-0f27-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz 
2JJPvr8f5). 
3. Id. at 3. 
4. See id. at 25 (contending that the idea of a legal duty to maximize shareholder profits is a 
myth). 
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anti-intellectual.  As this book illustrates, among a certain sort of academic, 
to describe something as an ideology is to condemn it.  Ideology is different 
from reason, but ideology has its place even in the life of educated, highly 
reflective people.  Professor Stout, however, trivializes the notion of ideology 
and considers the very use of the appellation “ideological” to be derogatory. 
In this Review I challenge the basic assumption that the idea of 
shareholder primacy is bad simply because it is, at least in part, ideological in 
nature.  Shareholder primacy, for all of its ideological baggage, is also 
efficient and sensible. 
I also defend the idea that shareholder primacy serves valuable salutary 
functions in corporate governance.  I also make what, at least to me, is the 
rather obvious point that if the myth of shareholder primacy were to be 
eradicated completely from the intellectual landscape, some other ideology 
would of necessity emerge to fill the void.  And on reading this book, I 
cannot avoid the conclusion that whatever new ideology might emerge will 
be far more pernicious and destructive than the extant, thoroughly benign 
myth of shareholder primacy. 
This Book Review is divided into three parts, each of which contains 
what I consider to be a serious challenge to the ideas propounded in The 
Shareholder Value Myth.  First, the book is an attempt to dislodge 
shareholders once and for all from their mythical, privileged role as the 
primary, and to some degree exclusive, beneficiaries of the efforts of 
corporate directors and senior managers.  Unfortunately, Professor Stout does 
not provide any clues as to where, if at all, shareholders would be moved in 
her preferred ranking.  Surely, shareholders should have some place in the 
corporation.  After all, shareholders’ money is required to capitalize the 
corporation.  If Professor Stout and her fellow travelers succeed in dislodging 
shareholders from their current, albeit mythical, position of primacy, where 
would these scholars place them within the panoply of corporate 
constituencies such as managers, creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, 
and local communities?  I consider this problem in Part I of this Review. 
My second objection deals with Professor Stout’s own ideology.  She 
rejects the ideology of shareholder-wealth maximization.  It is interesting to 
consider what, if any, ideology she herself proposes to embrace in its stead, 
which is the subject of Part II of this Review. 
In Part III, I complain that The Shareholder Value Myth is but a sheep in 
wolf’s clothing.  Shareholder primacy is not so much a myth as it is an 
aspiration.  For this reason, the aspiration that corporations’ officers and 
directors should maximize shareholder value simply cannot be the problem 
that Professor Stout asserts it to be.  In other words, the wolf disguise is the 
idea that maximizing value for shareholders actually causes any meaningful 
problems; in reality, shareholder value is not a concern to anybody because 
managers don’t have to maximize shareholder value.  Managers are virtually 
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free to ignore shareholder value in what they do (though not in what they 
say).  Professor Stout at one point actually acknowledges this point.5  In other 
words, if Professor Stout is right in claiming that shareholder primacy is a 
myth, then she must be wrong in her claim that it is a serious threat or 
problem.  Myths do not pose real threats. 
I. Ignore Them and They’ll Go Away: If Shareholders Aren’t Primary, 
Are They at Least Secondary?  Tertiary?  Mortuary? 
While Professor Stout is quite clear about what she opposes, it is not at 
all clear what she supports.  What Professor Stout opposes, vehemently, is 
shareholder primacy.6  Shareholder primacy is the notion that executives and 
senior managers must and should run their companies with the narrow, 
single-minded purpose of maximizing shareholder value at the expense of all 
other values.7  I do not think that anybody, and particularly scholars such as 
Jeffrey Gordon, Henry Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman, all of whom 
Professor Stout accuses of embracing this caricature of the shareholder 
primacy paradigm,8 would recognize their work in Professor Stout’s critique.  
But while Professor Stout is crystal clear in her desire to remove 
shareholders as top dogs in the corporate governance pecking order, she is 
frustratingly silent on where she would put them. 
Perhaps Professor Stout favors merely orchestrating a minor shuffle in 
the hierarchy of corporate relationships and would be content simply moving 
shareholders from first to second place.  Alternatively, sometimes it seems 
that Professor Stout might favor a more radical realignment, with shareholder 
wealth maximization being jettisoned altogether as a justification (or, if you 
prefer, as a pretext) for corporate action.9 
Perhaps Professor Stout does not think that the question of where to 
rank the interests of shareholders, in a post-shareholder-primacy age, is 
interesting or important.  Perhaps she never bothered to consider the issue, 
but it is important to address this question if we are to persuade investors to 
part with their money.  Before a rational investor can be persuaded to trade 
some of her wealth for the privilege of becoming an equity claimant in a 
public company, she will be interested in knowing where she will stand in 
the queue when it’s time to do things like develop corporate strategy, accept 
a merger proposal from another company, or distribute free cash flows to the 
 
5. See id. at 32 (noting that “maximizing shareholder value” is a “managerial choice” rather 
than an obligation). 
6. See id. at 6–8, 10–11 (outlining Professor Stout’s criticism of shareholder primacy). 
7. See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy 3 (Univ. of 
Toronto Legal Studies Series Research Paper No. 15-05, 2005) (explaining the concept of 
shareholder primacy). 
8. STOUT, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
9. See id. at 31–32 (characterizing maximization of shareholder wealth as optional and as 
simply one “possible corporate objective”). 
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various and sundry groups who are interested in having such cash flows 
diverted away from investors and towards themselves.  Would Professor 
Stout settle for moving shareholders out of first place and putting them in 
second place?  What about third?  Perhaps Professor Stout is joining the 
throng of scholars who believe that investors are irrational, and based on this 
belief, she takes the view that they will continue to invest no matter what.  It 
would be interesting to know where Professor Stout stands on all of this. 
We don’t know where maximizing shareholder value ranks on Professor 
Stout’s list of groups (workers, suppliers, local communities) and interests 
(the environment, philanthropy) that corporations should try to benefit.  Of 
equal concern, we also are never told what methodology decision makers 
should employ when formulating corporate strategy.10  In the absence of 
rules or standards or methods, the questions of how managers and directors 
decide whose interests the corporation should serve and how to go about 
serving such interests are of paramount importance. 
And here we come to the fun part of the book.  Professor Stout is no 
parvenu in the field of corporate law: she knows who runs corporations, and, 
stunningly, she has no interest in changing this facet of corporate 
governance.  In more or less plain view on page 32, Professor Stout 
acknowledges that management runs the corporation: 
  As far as the law is concerned, maximizing shareholder value is not 
a requirement; it is just one possible corporate objective out of many.  
Directors and executives can run corporations to maximize 
shareholder value, but unless the corporate charter provides otherwise, 
they are free to pursue any other lawful purpose as well.  Maximizing 
shareholder value is not a managerial obligation, it is a managerial 
choice.11 
This is the key passage in the book, and page 32 is the key page in the 
book.  Professor Stout’s message, slightly obscured, but discernible 
nonetheless, is that managers do and should run the corporation with plenary 
authority and with no reference to the shareholders’ interests.  The two key 
words in this book are “managerial choice.”12  The title of the book should 
have been not just The Shareholder Value Myth—it should have been The 
Shareholder Value Myth and the Managerial Value Reality. 
Most people think that the role of corporate governance is to protect 
shareholders from managers (i.e., to control agency costs).13  Professor Stout, 
on the other hand, appears to embrace the view that the role of corporate 
 
10. Id. at 10. 
11. Id. at 32. 
12. Id. at 4, 32. 
13. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 984, 988 (1993) (detailing the view of many academics that corporate governance should be 
proscribed by law because of the need to protect shareholders from managers). 
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governance is to protect management from shareholders.14  And bear in 
mind, as Professor Stout also makes clear on the crucial page 32, her theory 
is simultaneously positive (a description of the way things are) and normative 
(a description of the way things ought to be).15 
I certainly understand that corporate activists and gadflies sometimes 
argue that corporations should not serve “only” the interests of shareholders, 
but should also serve broader societal interests.  On the other hand, it is 
difficult to comprehend the notion that all power should be vested in the 
hands of corporate managers without articulating precisely what constraints 
should be placed on managers.  After reading page 32, one wonders what 
sorts of constraints the author believes should be imposed on managers.  
Astonishingly, the author offers not even a hint.  Managerial choice is, as far 
as this book is concerned, not only unconstrained as a matter of fact—it is 
unconstrained as a matter of policy.  For example, suppose a manager 
decides simply to steal a few million dollars from a company.  In the real 
world, where shareholder primacy is still the articulated and occasionally 
even the operational public policy objective of corporate law, such stealing 
of course is illegal because these assets are held for the benefit of the 
shareholders.  In Professor Stout’s strange alternative universe, it would 
appear that such stealing would be OK as long as the nonshareholder 
constituencies of the corporation (workers, the government, the environment, 
the local community) were not harmed.  Perhaps Professor Stout would even 
applaud having managers abscond with a few (hundred) million in corporate 
assets if those assets were distributed as gifts to worthy local charities. 
One can only wonder and imagine what legitimate policy interests 
might be served by acknowledging that we live in a legal environment of 
unconstrained managerial choice.  Professor Stout’s book posits that we 
really do live in a world of unconstrained managerial choice now.16  While as 
I explain in the following section, I think that Professor Stout is clearly 
mistaken in this assertion, hers is not a crazy position to take.  The really 
crazy part is the part in which Professor Stout argues that we should even 
stop pretending that top corporate managers operate in a world that is even 
loosely or fictionally constrained by the “myth” that managers are supposed 
to maximize value for shareholders. 
Wow.  Even those who feel uncomfortable with the shareholder value-
maximization model would worry about shifting to an unconstrained-
managerial-power model.  But Professor Stout is apparently so untroubled by 
the implications of this that she does not even pause to consider how 
 
14. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 46 (arguing that the traditional theory of corporate governance 
that focuses on making “boards more accountable to shareholders and more focused on increasing 
shareholder wealth . . . is inconsistent with both corporate law and with the real economic structure 
of public corporations”). 
15. Id. at 32. 
16. See id. (“Maximizing shareholder value is not a managerial obligation, it is a managerial 
choice.”). 
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different the world would look under her proposed regime.  The silent 
assumption is that society somehow will be better off if we free not only the 
professoriate, but also the corporate managerial class and even judges and 
legislators, from the myth of shareholder primacy.17 
The first problem with this point of view is that we live in the age of the 
imperial CEO.18  Within many parts of this particular substratum of society, 
the myth of shareholder primacy appears to have been eradicated root and 
branch eons ago.  Precious few (if any?) managers have succumbed to the 
myth of shareholder primacy.19  Rather, the shareholder-primacy illusion is a 
disease that appears disproportionately to afflict academics, theoreticians, 
and thankfully, the corporate bar and the Delaware judiciary. 
A second, more fundamental problem with Professor Stout’s point of 
view is that it rather alarmingly presumes that the corporate managerial class 
simply is not only different, but actually qualitatively better and certainly 
more moral than the rest of us.  In general, top corporate managers of large 
public companies are different from you and me in the Fitzgeraldian sense: 
they are rich and the rich are different.  Certain corporate managers, 
particularly in the megabanks that dominate the U.S. economy,20 seem to me 
to be rather careless, like Tom and Daisy in The Great Gatsby: “They were 
careless people, Tom and Daisy—they smashed up things and creatures and 
then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness or whatever it 
was that kept them together, and let other people clean up the mess they had 
made . . . .”21 
Professor Stout’s bottom line is right there on the cover.  Her book’s 
title purportedly explains “how putting shareholders first harms investors, 
corporations, and the public.”  On reading the book, however, one also 
discovers that Professor Stout is of the view that putting managers first—or 
at least freeing managers of the constraints of the shareholder value-
maximization myth—somehow would help investors, corporations, and the 
 
17. See id. at 46 (proclaiming that the “shareholder primacy ideology is inconsistent with both 
corporate law and with the real economic structure of public corporations” and with “empirical 
evidence”). 
18. Scott Green, Unfinished Business: Abolish the Imperial CEO!, J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN., 
Sept./Oct. 2004, at 19, 19–22. 
19. Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 
2012, at 48, 50. 
20. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to 
Financial Reputation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368 (2011) (describing the dominance of the very largest 
U.S. financial institutions). 
21. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 179 (Scribner trade paperback ed. 2004).  This 
appears to be a pretty good description of what happened in the U.S. in various financial crises.  The 
people who do the cleaning up are, of course, the politicians, and U.S. taxpayers are the ones 
footing the bills.  Examples include the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco era, which was followed by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), and the financial crisis 
that began in 2007, which was followed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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public.  This seems to me to be one of those flagrantly erroneous assertions 
that is refuted merely in the telling. 
It is interesting to ponder how far Professor Stout would go in her 
allegiance to unconstrained managerial primacy.  Clearly the oft-articulated 
notion that managers’ fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are owed 
exclusively to shareholders must be abandoned.  Presumably another 
vestigial remnant of the shareholder-primacy myth that should be jettisoned 
is what Professor Stout apparently regards as the silly tradition that 
shareholders, and only shareholders, are eligible to vote to elect corporate 
directors.  For example, only shareholders get to cast advisory votes on 
executive compensation arrangements, and of course only shareholders get to 
elect corporate directors.22 
II. OK, So Shareholder Primacy Is Dead, and We Need a New Myth to 
Replace It? 
My second complaint about the analysis in this book also falls into the 
category of worrying about what might emerge to replace the shareholder 
primacy paradigm that Professor Stout seeks to eradicate.  Shareholder 
primacy is, as Professor Stout rightly points out, a “dogma,”23 “a belief 
system that was rarely questioned,”24 and a mere “ideology.”25  But the book 
does not seem to take itself seriously enough to address the question of the 
role served by mere dogma and ideology.  The assertion that shareholder 
primacy certainly has an ideological component, just as other notions, such 
as “democracy” and “freedom of religion” and even “capitalism” do.  But 
like some of these other ideologies, it is an ideology with a basis in reason 
and in fact.  As such, before we jettison our possibly dogmatic belief in 
shareholder primacy, we first should consider whether or not we should 
replace it with another, perhaps sounder, ideology.  Alternatively, of course, 
it is conceivable (though barely) that Professor Stout is simply an anarchist 
and that she favors the complete eradication of every sort of structured belief 
system.  But this does not seem to me an attainable goal.  As long as there are 
business organizations of any kind, the people who run them likely will have 
some notion or theory about what they are supposed to be doing (like 
maximizing profits or saving the whales) and why they are doing it (because 
that is the basis on which they were hired).  If we get rid of shareholder 
primacy as the response to the question “what should the people who run 
businesses do?,” it would appear that we have to replace it with something 
else.  Professor Stout’s only answer is that businesses should do whatever 
their managers want them to do.  This hardly seems like a slogan likely to 
 
22. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178-secg.htm. 
23. STOUT, supra note 1, at 21. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 3. 
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attract many principled supporters, much less to inspire people to pitch their 
tents in public parks in wintertime. 
It would be interesting to know what “myth” or creed or legal objective 
Professor Stout thinks might replace the shareholder primacy myth.  Like the 
Occupy Wall Street Movement itself, this book is loud and clear on what it is 
against, but is deadly silent on what it is for.  There are a lot of myths that 
millions of people, often the most innocent and vulnerable in society, persist 
in embracing.  Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy are two examples that seem 
to cling on generation after generation in the West.  Perhaps Professor Stout 
does not understand that there are myths that are malignant, but that there are 
also myths that are entirely benign.  Some myths, like the one about 
cognitive differences among racial groups, are virulently malignant.  Others, 
like the myth of shareholder primacy, seem quite benign.  In fact, Professor 
Stout has no analysis or description of the harm, if any, that is done by the 
shareholder value myth. 
In her book, Professor Stout successfully makes the point that top 
corporate managers do not really have to maximize shareholder value.26  I 
agree.  In fact, I make this very point every year to my students when I teach 
the introductory survey course on corporate law.  My students have no 
difficulty grasping this point, particularly because it is a core implication of 
the business judgment rule,27 not to mention a central component of the cases 
permitting corporations to donate money to charities that have little or no 
connection to the interests of the corporation.28  But if I am right that some 
myths are more harmful than others (and surely I am), then it is not sufficient 
for Professor Stout merely to assert that the notion of shareholder value 
maximization is a myth.  She also must establish somehow that it is a 
harmful myth.  This she utterly fails to do.  A lot of important legal doctrines, 
like the corporate opportunity doctrine,29 the duty of loyalty,30 and the duty 
 
26. STOUT, supra note 1, at 32. 
27. The business judgment rule is “a legal principle that makes officers, directors, managers, 
and other agents of a corporation immune from liability to the corporation for loss incurred in 
corporate transactions that are within their authority and power to make when sufficient evidence 
demonstrates that the transactions were made in good faith.”  Business Judgment Rule, in WEST’S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW at 190–92 (2d ed. 2005). 
28. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (affirming 
dismissal because the business judgment rule allows the director of a professional baseball team to 
make decisions based on “the effect on the surrounding neighborhood”). 
29. The corporate opportunity doctrine states that 
if there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity which the 
corporation is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the corpo-
ration’s business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has 
an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-
interest of the officer or director will be brought into conflict with that of his 
corporation, the law will not permit him to seize the opportunity for himself. 
 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939). 
30. “As a matter of agency law, an employee owes a duty of loyalty to her employer.  A breach 
of this duty occurs when an employee (a) competes directly with her employer, (b) misappropriates 
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of care31 are anchored in the shareholder value-maximization model/myth.  It 
would be bad simply to jettison these doctrines because, notwithstanding that 
they may be grounded in the myth of shareholder primacy, these doctrines 
reduce managerial pilfering and negligence and make corporations more 
valuable than they would be if they did not exist.  Moreover, Professor Stout 
offers no replacements for the shareholder value-maximization paradigm that 
she seeks to depose.  Some pretty bad behaviors, including gross negligence, 
fraud, and theft, are considered illegal because they conflict with the 
shareholder value-maximization model/myth.  Would such behavior still be 
outlawed in Ms. Stout’s Brave New World? 
If we bury once and for all the shareholder value myth, both in theory as 
well as in practice, and replace it with nothing other than the recognition that 
corporations are controlled in plenary fashion by their top corporate 
managers, then such managers really will be free to have their wanton way 
with the corporate assets under their control.  This does not sound like a 
particularly attractive alternative to our current status as dwellers in a legal 
landscape clouded by a heavy fog of shareholder wealth-maximization 
ideology. 
The notion of shareholder wealth maximization is not explained very 
well in The Shareholder Value Myth.  It is overly simplistic simply to assume 
that maximizing value for shareholders means maximizing returns.32  Rather, 
maximizing the value of a corporation’s shares means maximizing the 
expected value of such shares.  Expected value in this context refers to future 
value of shares adjusted for risk.  Absent any consideration of risk, a 
corporate manager might pursue an investment that has a 10% chance of 
returning $500 million and a 90% chance of bankrupting the company and 
wiping out all shareholder value.  The expected value of this investment, 
however, is only $50 million, and investors would prefer an investment with 
a 10% chance of gaining $65 million and a 90% chance of merely breaking 
even because the latter investment has an expected value of $51.6 million.33  
Because shareholder wealth maximization involves taking the risks as well as 
the rewards from corporate activity into account, the notion is not quite as 
wacky as sometimes is suggested. 
 
her employer’s profits, property, or business opportunities, or (c) breaches her employer’s 
confidences.”  Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 515–17 (4th Cir. 1999). 
31. As Caremark states: 
Director liability for a breach of the duty to exercise appropriate attention may, in 
theory, arise in two distinct contexts.  First, such liability may be said to follow from a 
board decision that results in a loss because that decision was ill advised or ‘negligent’.  
Second, liability to the corporation for a loss may be said to arise from an unconsidered 
failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, 
have prevented the loss. 
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
32. STOUT, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
33. (.10 × $500 million + .90 × $0) = $50 million; (.1 × $65 million + .9 × $50 million) = 
$51.5 million. 
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It is true, of course, that sometimes the best alternative for a company is 
to take big risks.  With big risks come big losses, but big gains usually cannot 
be achieved without taking big risks.  As long as the risks are fully disclosed 
to the other participants in the corporate enterprise, and as long as such risks 
are managed (and, where possible, hedged) competently, risk taking is not a 
problem.  In fact it generally is believed that risk taking should actively be 
encouraged because such risk taking leads to innovation, economic growth, 
and important improvements in society.  Risk taking clearly has a place in a 
world in which we cling, even if only in our hopes and aspirations, to the 
myth of shareholder value. 
In contrast, risk taking appears to play no role whatsoever in Professor 
Stout’s world without myth.  If we diminish, much less eliminate, 
shareholders from our list of constituencies that corporate managers are 
supposed to serve, we are left only with the interests of fixed claimants, i.e., 
those claimants like workers, creditors, and local communities who enter into 
specific contractual relationships with corporations.  For solvent companies, 
meeting the obligations owed to these constituencies does not require 
marginal risk taking.  Marginal risk taking benefits only shareholders.  Thus, 
Professor Stout’s eliminating the myth of shareholder value also would 
eliminate the reality of risk taking, which is the critical component of 
entrepreneurship.  This does not appear to be a recipe for anything other than 
economic catastrophe in light of the fact that economies that innovate survive 
and flourish, while those that do not innovate wither and die. 
III. It Is Impossible to Kill a Theory That Is Already Dead 
My final objection to The Shareholder Value Myth is that the entire 
exercise is but a failed attempt to present a sheep in wolf’s clothing.  The 
wolf disguise is a metaphor for the allegedly frightening idea that 
maximizing value for shareholders actually causes any meaningful problems 
for anybody.  Shareholder value is not a concern to anybody because 
managers don’t have to take extreme or socially destructive actions in the 
name of maximizing shareholder value.  And nobody—literally nobody—
thinks that managers can or should break the law for the sake of maximizing 
shareholder value.  Managers are virtually free to ignore shareholder value in 
what they do (though perhaps not in what they say).  But they are not free to 
steal from the company with impunity under a shareholder wealth-
maximization model.  But who would be damaged by a little stealing 
(particularly if it were done in “Robin Hood” fashion under Professor Stout’s 
approach to corporate governance)?  Nobody would be harmed if the 
corporation could pay all of its creditors and other fixed claimants in full, 
because the only people left are shareholders, and the whole point of 
Professor Stout’s book is that we do not and ought not pay a shred of 
attention to that grasping cohort of greedy speculators. 
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So, yes, there are lots and lots of problems in corporate America, but, as 
Professor Stout herself clearly acknowledges at various points in her book, 
these problems are not driven by the fact that shareholder value is being 
pursued too rigorously.34  Maximizing shareholder value is largely an 
aspirational concept, and corporate managers, corporate lawyers, corporate 
governance activists, and their interlocutors are acutely aware of this fact.  
On this point Professor Stout is correct.  Where she is clearly in error is in 
her notion that this is a point that every other lawyer in America somehow 
has failed to notice. 
For example, Professor Stout is right to say that, as a practical matter, 
the business judgment rule eviscerates large swathes of the notion of 
shareholder value maximization.35  The business judgment rule, which 
protects most business decisions from judicial second-guessing, means that 
top executives and directors are free to do virtually anything they want with 
and to shareholders’ money and never have to say they are sorry to 
shareholders, courts, workers, or anybody else.36 
Professor Stout begins her attack on the shareholder value-maximization 
theory by recounting the tragedy of the April 20, 2010 catastrophe in the 
Gulf of Mexico that began with the massive explosion on BP’s Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig and subsequent oil spill.  Professor Stout observes that: 
  The Deepwater Horizon disaster was tragedy on an epic scale, not 
only for the rig and the eleven people who died on it, but also for the 
corporation BP.  By June of 2010, BP had suspended paying its 
regular dividends, and BP common stock (trading around $60 before 
the spill) had plunged to less than $30 per share.  The result was a 
decline in BP’s total stock market value amounting to nearly $100 
billion.  BP’s shareholders were not the only ones to suffer.  The value 
of BP bonds tanked as BP’s credit rating was cut from a prestigious 
AA to the near-junk status BBB.37 
Having just explained how damaging the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
was for shareholders, Professor Stout then unhesitatingly asserts that “the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster is only one example of a larger problem that 
afflicts many public corporations today.  That problem might be called 
shareholder value thinking.”38  I am at a complete loss to understand how an 
event that cost shareholders over half of the value of their investment in a 
company can be blamed on a doctrine that says that managers are supposed 
to maximize value for shareholders.  Blaming a catastrophe that destroyed 
massive amounts of shareholders’ wealth on a theory that posits that 
 
34. STOUT, supra note 1, at 3, 4, 8, 32. 
35. Id. at 43. 
36. Business Judgment Rule, supra note 27. 
37. STOUT, supra note 1, at 1. 
38. Id. at 2. 
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companies should maximize shareholders’ wealth is not the sort of 
association or causal link that is consistent with logic or reason. 
Professor Stout goes on to refer to a report by the National Commission 
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, which, 
according to Stout, concluded that the catastrophe “could be traced to 
multiple decisions by BP employees and contractors to ignore standard safety 
procedures in the attempt to cut costs.”39  In fact, the National Commission 
itself had a different account of where the blame for the catastrophe should 
go.  The Commission blamed “years of industry and government 
complacency and lack of attention to safety,” not the single-minded pursuit 
by management of environmentally tainted lucre for shareholders: 
  Our investigation shows that a series of specific and preventable 
human and engineering failures were the immediate causes of the 
disaster. . . .  [T]his disaster was almost the inevitable result of years 
of industry and government complacency and lack of attention to 
safety.  This was indisputably the case with BP, Transocean, and 
Halliburton, as well as the government agency charged with regulating 
offshore drilling—the former Minerals Management Service.  As 
drilling pushes into ever deeper and riskier waters where more of 
America’s oil lies, only systemic reforms of both government and 
industry will prevent a similar, future disaster.40 
But even if one were to fantasize that some misguided notion of 
shareholder value maximization on the part of BP management somehow 
was to blame for the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, it 
does not stand to reason that shareholder value maximization in general is at 
fault.  In fact, the opposite is true.  If BP was trying to maximize value for 
shareholders, it failed miserably.  It failed to such an extent that shareholders 
in BP and in the other public companies involved in the disaster can sue BP 
for its failure to adequately protect shareholders’ wealth and to fully disclose 




40. Press Release, Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, 
Oil Spill Commission Landmark Report on Gulf Disaster Proposes Urgent Reform of Industry and 




41. Deepwater Horizon Oilspill Shareholder Lawsuits, PARKER WAICHMAN LLP, 
http://www.yourlawyer.com/topics/overview/BP-Deepwater-Horizon-Oil-Spill-Shareholder-
Lawsuits (describing shareholder derivative lawsuits against BP and other companies); Kevin 
LaCroix, BP Deepwater Horizon Securities Suit, Though Narrowed, Survives Dismissal Motion, 
THE D&O DIARY (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/tags/deepwater-horizon (describing 
securities fraud suit against BP based on BP shareholders’ “allegations that they had been misled 
regarding BP safety efforts and processes”). 
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In other words, it appears that old-fashioned bureaucratic ineptitude at 
both the government and the corporate levels are to blame for the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster.  Shareholder wealth maximization is no more to blame for 
this catastrophe than the Framers of the Constitution are culpable for the 
Monica Lewinsky scandal, or Watergate, or the various invasions of Iraq.  
Failure to perform in a manner that is consistent with a perfectly valid norm 
(e.g., the separation of powers, the right to privacy, shareholder wealth 
maximization) is not the fault of the norm; it is the fault of the person who 
fails to perform. 
This point seems even more powerful where the norm that has been 
violated is, as Professor Stout asserts, merely a myth.  After all, if Professor 
Stout is correct that the notion of shareholder value maximization is nothing 
more than an urban myth, then Professor Stout must be wrong to assert that 
shareholder value maximization is causing a problem for anybody.  Myths 
don’t cause problems because they are imaginary.  Yet Professor Stout 
argues simultaneously that shareholder value maximization is a myth and a 
major problem in corporate governance and law.  In other words, by claiming 
that shareholder value is a myth and then decrying the harm that it does, 
Professor Stout is quite literally tilting at windmills. 
Conclusion 
Yes, I concede that for the reasons articulated by Professor Stout, the 
notion of shareholder value maximization is in many contexts more 
aspirational or real.  In this sense it has characteristics in common with 
myths.  Of course, the raison d’être for Professor Stout’s spirited attack on 
shareholder value maximization is the stubborn persistence of the 
shareholder value myth in the imaginations of scholars and practitioners of 
corporate law.  Unfortunately, the reason why Professor Stout wants to 
destroy the myth of shareholder value maximization is not revealed in this 
book, at least not in any persuasive way.  As noted above, her attempt to link 
the myth to corporate catastrophes, like the environmental disaster caused by 
BP’s Gulf Coast oil rig in 2010, are not convincing or even credible.  
Professor Stout herself does not even attempt to draw a link between the 
catastrophe and the theory of shareholder value maximization that she is 
attacking.  Perhaps, like many academics, Professor Stout simply finds myths 
to be annoying and anti-intellectual.  Perhaps it makes no sense to someone 
fervently trying to lead a “life of the mind” to indulge in myth, superstition, 
fantasy or any other way of viewing the world that is not firmly grounded in 
observable, demonstrable fact.  I respectfully disagree.  Many brilliant minds 
have spent long and productive careers exploring the nature, purposes, and 
effects of myths and legends.  While it is true that ancient myths appear to be 
held in much higher regard than myths of more modern vintage, there is no a 
priori rule why this should be so. 
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 As far as myths go, the myth of shareholder value maximization is 
perhaps my favorite among many appealing rivals.  The Tooth Fairy is right 
up there in the running, though I think that there is significantly more support 
for and merit in the shareholder value myth than the Tooth Fairy myth.  For a 
year or two though, my eight-year-old’s embrace of the “Jewish Santa” myth 
probably will continue to dominate my own private hierarchy of myths. 
